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Abstract
In this thesis, we propose an FPGA cluster infrastructure which can
be utilized in implementing cryptanalytic attacks and accelerating crypto-
graphic operations. The cluster can be formed using simple and inexpen-
sive, off-the-shelf FPGA boards featuring an FPGA device, local storage,
CPLD, and network connection. Forming the cluster is simple and no effort
for the hardware development is needed except for the hardware design for
the actual computation. Using a softcore processor on FPGA, we are able to
configure FPGA devices dynamically and change their configuration on the
fly from a remote computer. The softcore on FPGA can execute relatively
complicated programs for mundane tasks unworthy of FPGA resources. Fi-
nally, we propose and implement a fast and efficient dynamic configuration
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switch technique that is shown to be useful especially in cryptanalytic appli-
cations. Our infrastructure provides a cost-effective alternative for formerly
proposed cryptanalytic engines based on FPGA devices.
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KRI˙PTOLOJI˙K HESAPLAMALAR I˙C¸I˙N, BASI˙T SPKD
C¸EVRI˙M KARTLARINDAN OLUS¸MUS¸ KU¨MELERI˙N
GERC¸EKLENMESI˙
Yarkın DORO¨Z
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2011
Tez Danıs¸manı: Doc¸. Dr. Erkay Savas¸
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriptografi I˙c¸in Yeniden Yapılandırabilinen Hesaplama,
Kripto-analitik Saldırılar, Kriptografik Hızlandırma, Kriptografik Algoritmaların
Donanımsal Gerc¸eklenmesi
O¨zet
Bu tez ile, kripto-analitik saldırıların gerc¸eklenmesi ve kriptografik operasy-
onların hızlandırılması ic¸in tasarlanmıs¸, SPKD’lerden (Sahada Programlanabilir
Kapı Dizileri) olus¸an bir ku¨me altyapısı sunuyoruz. Bahsi gec¸en ku¨me altyapısı,
SPKD cihazı, yerel depolama, KPMC (Karmas¸ık Programlanabilir Mantıksal Ci-
haz) ve ag˘ bag˘lantısı ic¸eren ucuz ve kullanıma hazır SPKD c¸evrim kartlarından
olus¸maktadır. Ku¨me olus¸turma is¸leminin basit olmasının yanısıra hesaplamalar
ic¸in gerekli olan donanım tasarımı haric¸ herhangi bir donanım gelis¸tirme gerek-
tirmemektedir. SPKDlerde gerc¸eklenebilen bir is¸lemci c¸ekirdeg˘i sayesinde, SPKD
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cihazlarını dinamik olarak yapılandırmak ve hatta yapılandırma ayarlarını, is¸lem
sırasında bile, uzaktaki bir bilgisayar u¨zerinden deg˘is¸tirmek mu¨mku¨ndu¨r. Aynı za-
manda bu is¸lemci c¸ekirdeg˘i, karmas¸ık programları SPKDnin kaynaklarını kullan-
maksızın yu¨ru¨tu¨lebilmektedir. Ek olarak, bu tez ile dinamik yapılandırma deg˘is¸im
teknig˘i de o¨neriyoruz. Uygulamasını gerc¸ekledig˘imiz bu teknik o¨zellikle kripto-
analitik saldırılarda hızlı ve verimli bir s¸ekilde kullanılabildig˘inden, SPKD ta-
banlı geleneksel kripto-analitik makinalara go¨re daha uygun maliyetli bir alter-
natif olus¸turmaktadır.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic operations usually contain high degree of parallelism, which favors
repetitive instantiation of the same basic block for the cryptographic primitives.
Thus, hardware-based cryptographic accelerators, harnessing the aforementioned
parallelism, have become the focus of both industrial and academical interests
especially in the last two decades.
Cryptanalytic studies aim to discover the strength of cryptographic algorithms
against certain attack techniques, efficiency of which is determined by, to a large
extent, amount of computational power available at affordable costs. As it is pos-
sible to make relatively accurate predictions (at least so far) for the increase in
computational power and decrease in their associate costs in future (e.g. Moore’s
Law), we can provide some predictions for the future strength of certain crypto-
graphic algorithms and their key lengths. Moreover, since increase in raw com-
putational power does not necessarily lead to the same level of increase in our
capacity for breaking ciphers, it is important to work on new architectures that
will make an efficient use of the new computing capabilities. As in the case of
cryptographic operations, even more so, cryptanalytic applications are character-
ized by a vast degree of inherent parallelism that can be utilized best by hardware
architectures.
Recent developments in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) technology,
especially in terms of increased resources and declining costs, emphasize the con-
figurable logic devices as the economic alternative for both cryptographic accel-
eration and cryptanalytic computations. Grasping this great potential, previous
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works in literature propose FPGA-based designs and architectures for both cryp-
tographic acceleration [26, 20] and cryptanalytic purposes [19, 7, 8]. Combining
the power of hardware, especially by taking advantage of the parallelism, with the
flexibility of software based design through rapid prototyping, FPGAs are yet to
offer their great potential in cryptologic applications.
Nowadays, many FPGAs can be configured to implement microprocessor cores
that can handle mundane tasks, which are not performance bound and unworthy
of valuable FPGA resources. Implementing a communication protocol such as
TCP/IP stack or interacting with peripherals are examples of such tasks. MicroB-
laze, which is a soft processor core (referred as softcore henceforth) by Xilinx
and can be implemented even on the most inexpensive FPGAs using the general-
purpose logic available on all FPGAs [37], can be utilized in this context.
In addition, FPGAs can be dynamically configured to implement multiple
hardware designs. Relatively fast dynamical switching between configurations
provides agility as well as flexibility to meet computational diversity of crypto-
logic applications. Moreover, the configuration files for multiple designs can be
sent over a network (if the device is connected). If different configuration files are
stored in a local memory, the configuration switch between hardware designs can
be very fast.
Last, but not the least, simple FPGA boards featuring low-end FPGA devices
such as Spartan-3E [36] offer network interface and local storage, and come at
a very low cost. One such board, Spartan-3E Starter Kit [38], proves that it is
possible to have the best of both software and hardware worlds in a very cost-
effective manner.
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In this thesis, we propose an FPGA cluster for cryptologic purposes using
Spartan-3E family FPGAs. Our approach differs from similar and the closest
works in [19, 7, 8] in the sense that a super computer does from a server cluster.
Our FPGA cluster can be formed using a host-PC acting as the cluster head and
any off-the-shelf FPGA board featuring an FPGA, a network interface, local stor-
age, and a simple Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD). A router that
provides fast connection is beneficial, but not necessary.
The cluster head is not only responsible for coordinating the computational ac-
tivities, but also for configuring the FPGA devices in the cluster. In every FPGA,
there is one permanent configuration for the softcore stored in the flash memory.
The softcore runs on an FPGA in idle times, and performs essential tasks in load-
ing new hardware configurations besides other non-specialized tasks. The cluster
head can also send code segments for the softcore to run software applications
contributing to the agility of the overall system.
The proposed cluster can be efficiently used for cryptanalytic purposes such
as exhaustive search. For certain cases, it can also be used as an accelerator to
speedup the cryptographic applications. By supporting a fast, dynamic config-
uration switch, each FPGA board can combine the versatility of general-purpose
computer with the parallel computing capability of hardware designs, even for FP-
GAs in the low-end of the cost spectrum. The software components we develop
and denote as proxies running both in the cluster head and the softcore enables
a transparent programing experience similar to the one provided only by middle-
ware for parallel programing and remote procedure call.
Outline of the thesis is as follows: Section 2 gives background information on
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efficient modular arithmetic, followed by elliptic curve cryptography and Pollard
Rho Attack. Section 3 gives information about the Programmable Logic Devices
that are used in the process and their features in detail. Section 4 provides the de-
tails of the proposed architecture for FPGA cluster, its operational steps, usage of
the proposed cluster for cryptographic acceleration and cryptanalysis. Implemen-
tation details and experimental results are provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes the thesis by summarizing the achievements.
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2 Background Information
In this section, we start by giving background information on asymmetrical cryp-
tography and give mathematical background on the modular arithmetic algorithms.
Later, we give details on elliptic curves and one of its forms known as Huff curves.
Afterwards, we describe the usage of Pollard Rho attack algorithm and give fea-
tures of the reconfigurable logic devices and softcores on FPGAs. Lastly, we give
detailed information on related works.
2.1 Modular Arithmetic
In this section we give detailed information on the algorithms for big integer mod-
ular arithmetics, such as modular multiplication, modular inversion and modular
addition/subtraction. Efficient algorithms are introduced in the following sections
for each of the modular arithmetic operations in order to perform faster arith-
metics on computers and electronic devices. Also, these algorithms require form
conversions for their operands which is described in Section 2.1.4.
2.1.1 Modular Multiplication
Modular multiplication is a costly operation, especially the cryptographic opera-
tions are taken into account. For instance, in ECRYPT II [12] the suggested key
length for legacy RSA systems isN > 1024 bits and for new systems isN > 2432
bits. The multiplication of such big numbers have huge costs both in software and
in hardware.
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There are different methods to make modular multiplication efficient and one
of the fastest algorithms is Montgomery multiplication [23]. The algorithm simply
utilizes addition, subtraction and shifting operations to perform modular multipli-
cation. Montgomery multiplication exchanges the division operation of the classi-
cal methods, which is used for reduction, with simple shift operations, so that the
algorithm works faster. On the down side of the algorithm, the multiplier and the
multiplicand should be converted into another form which is called Montgomery
form. The conversion operation along with the multiplication operation is costlier
than classical modular multiplications. However, for operations require multiple
multiplications, such as modular exponentiation, only two conversion operations
are required and therefore extra costs due to conversions are negligible. Therefore,
Montgomery multiplication is beneficial when many multiplication operations in
a cryptographic algorithm is required. The steps of Montgomery multiplication
given in Algorithm 1 is defined in equation (1) (T and S are two numbers that
will be multiplied and are smaller than the modulus N ):
Modular Multiplication(T; S;N) = 2 k T S mod N (1)
2.1.2 Modular Inversion
Modular inversion operation is frequently used in cryptographic applications. Since
it is usually the costliest arithmetic operation when implemented both in hard-
ware and software, an efficient inversion algorithm is needed in order to increase
the performance of cryptosystems. The Montgomery inversion [15] is one of the
6
Algorithm 1Modular Multiplication
Input: X = Multiplicand, (Xk 1; Xk 2; Xk 3; : : : X2; X1; X0), X < N
Y = Multiplier, Y < N
N = Modulus
k = Bit Size of N
Output: R = X Y 2 k mod N
R 0
for i = 0! k   1 do
if Xi == 1 then
R R + Y
end if
if R0 == 1 then
R R +N
end if
R R2
end for
if R > N then
R R N
end if
return R
7
fastest algorithm to perform inversion of big numbers.
Similar to the modular multiplication, the division operation is replaced by
simple shift operations. The operand also needs to be converted into Montgomery
form in order to be used in the Montgomery inversion algorithm. Conversion of an
operand to the Montgomery form and from the Montgomery form are costly op-
erations, but Montgomery inversion can be used in conjunction with Montgomery
multiplication in cryptographic applications, which will eventually have a higher
performance over classical modular multiplication and inversion methods. The
Montgomery inversion algorithm is composed of two phases and the output of the
first algorithmic step is used as an input by the second algorithmic step. These
phases are given in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 which computes the following:
Mod Inv(R) = 2 2k R mod N (2)
where R = 2m; m = dlog2Ne.
2.1.3 Modular Addition/Subtraction
Modular addition and subtraction are the simplest modular arithmetic operations.
They can be implemented efficiently both in hardware and software. Even for
large bit sizes, addition and subtraction operation can be implemented in a few
clock cycles in hardware. The modular addition and subtraction operations are
divided into blocks and every block is processed one at a time to have a higher
clock frequency and lower the area size in hardware.
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Algorithm 2Modular Inversion / Phase - I
Input: X = Operand
N = Modulus
m = Bit Size of N
Output: R = N   r, r = X 1 2k,m  k  2 m
u N ; v  X; r  0; s 1; k  0
while v > 0 do
if u0 == 0 then
u u2; s s 2
else if v0 == 0 then
v  v2; r  r  2
else if u > v then
u (u  v)=22; r  r + s; s s 2
else
v  (v   u)=22; s r + s; r  r  2
end if
k  k + 1
end while
if r > N then
r  r  N
end if
return N   r; k
Algorithm 3Modular Inversion / Phase II
Input: k = k value fromAlgorithm 2
t = N   r value from Algorithm 2
N = Modulus
Output: w = X 1 2m mod N
w  t
for i = 1! (2 m  k) do
w  w=2
if w > N then
w  w  N
end if
end for
return w
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2.1.4 Montgomery Form
Efficient modular multiplication and inversion algorithms are based on Mont-
gomery arithmetic. The operands used by the algorithms should be converted into
Montgomery form in order to be used by the algorithms. The conversion opera-
tions are costly operations, so their usage for only one multiplication or inversion
will not be efficient. However, the extra cost of conversion will be negligible when
many multiplication operations are executed as in the case of cryptography.
The conversion of the operands can be achieved by multiplying the operands
with 2m. An operand, say T , should be taken the form of 2m T mod N , where
m is the bit size of N . This conversion can be performed by using only Mont-
gomery Multiplication Algorithm, so that no extra logic or function needed to be
implemented. If operands need to be converted, then the Modular Multiplication
is used as following for the conversion:
Modular Multiplication(T; 22m; N) = 2m T = R mod N (3)
When the operands are in Montgomery form, the arithmetic operations will
output the results in Montgomery form as well. Therefore, result of a multipli-
cation operation can be used as an operand in another multiplication or inversion
operation. As long as the calculations continue, no conversions are needed to
turn them back to their original form. After the calculations the results can be
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converted back to the original forms by using Montgomery multiplication again:
Modular Multiplication(R; 1; N) = 2 m R = T mod N (4)
Modular addition and subtraction is also compatible with Montgomery multi-
plication and inversion. The operands from the Montgomery form can be used in
the addition and subtraction algorithms and being in a Montgomery form or not
will not affect the calculations. For instance, for the operands that are in the Mont-
gomery forms addition and subtraction operations will also output in the Mont-
gomery form: 2m A  2m B = 2m (A  B) mod N . Therefore, Montgomery
multiplication and inversion can be used with modular addition and subtraction in
an algorithm without the need of any form conversions between the operations.
2.2 Asymmetrical Cryptography
In Public Key Cryptosystems [PKCs], each communicating parties poses a public
key and a private key. The public key of a party is open to the public and it
is used by other parties to encrypt messages and send them to the public key
owner. The private key is used to decrypt these messages. These public and
private keys are different from each other, while they are linked in a mathematical
way. This mathematical relation is computationally infeasible to solve by modern
day computers for adequate key lengths.
PKCs are widely used to solve modern day security problems for daily com-
puter users. Many PKCs are proposed to solve different security problems, such
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as anonymity, integrity and authentication. Some of the main PKCs are RSA [32],
Diffie-Hellman [3], Elliptic Curve Cryptography [18], El-Gamal [5], Digital Sig-
nature Standard [25] and Paillier Cryptosystem [29].
2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography [ECC] is a public key cryptography system based on
the elliptic curve algebra using finite field arithmetic, which is proposed indepen-
dently by Victor S. Miller [22] and Neal Koblitz [18]. The security of the ECC is
based on the discrete logarithm problem for the points of an elliptic curve. ECC
systems provide the same level of security against RSA based systems using much
smaller bit sizes. This is especially beneficial in small systems that are limited in
energy and memory, like RFIDs and embedded systems.
2.3.1 Curve Property
Most of the ECC systems use the Weierstrass equation [35] for their curve struc-
ture with different parameters:
y2 = x3 + a x+ b mod p (5)
The a and b are two coefficients that are 0  a; b < p and p is a prime number.
Different coefficients, a and b, define different curves over Fp. Selection of bigger
primes for p will increase the number of points defined on the curve and their
group order which will eventually increase its security level.
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2.3.2 Point Property
In ECC, points that are solutions to the equation (5) form an Abelian group [16]
together with elliptic curve group operation and with an extra point called point of
infinity, which behave as the identity element of the group and denoted as1. The
elliptic curve group operations of two group elements will result in an element
that is in the same group, because of the closure property. Therefore, it is possible
to create points in the same group using elliptic curve operations such as point
addition, point doubling and scalar multiplication.
2.3.3 Point Addition
The point addition is the basic operation that takes two points on the curve and
outputs a point on the curve. The addition operation can be applied to any two
points on the curve which will result in a new point on the curve. The calculation
of the addition between two points, say P and Q, can be done as follows:
1. A line is drawn that passes through P and Q is added to the graph.
2. All the intersection points of the curve and the line are determined.
3. If there is a point Z in an intersection which is not P and Q, then result is
the projection of point Z with respect to x axis.
4. If there is not a point rather than P and Q, then result of the addition is1.
An example of the addition operation is illustrated in Figure 1. There are three
intersection points and the addition of these points will be P + Q + Z = 1.
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Therefore, P +Q =  Z.
P
Q
Z
-Z
P + Q + Z =   ∞
Figure 1: Point Addition
Algebraically, calculating the addition operation of the points P and Q can be
performed using the formulae:
1. The slope of the line that passes through P and Q is calculated as, t =
(yp yq)
(xp xq) .
2. Then, xz = t2   xp   xq.
3. Then, yz =  yp + t (xp   xz).
2.3.4 Point Doubling
The doubling operation of a point is basically addition of a point by itself. Calcu-
lation of point doubling is similar for the geometric approach. As for the algebraic
approach the doubling operation for a point, say P , can be done as follows:
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1. A tangent line is drawn to the curve that passes through the point P .
2. All the intersection points of the curve and the line are determined.
3. If there is a point Z in an intersection which is not P , then result is the
inverse of point Z.
4. If there is not a point rather than P , then result of the addition is1.
An example of the doubling operation is illustrated in Figure 2. There are
two intersecting points and the addition of these points will be 2 P + Z = 1.
Therefore, 2 P =  Z.
P Z
-Z
P + P + Z = ∞
Figure 2: Point Doubling
Algebraically, calculating the doubling operation cannot be done by using the
formula for the point addition operation. If the point addition formula is used,
while calculating t = (yp yq)
(xp xq) , the divisor will result in zero. Thus, for doubling
operations the formula is as the following:
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1. By taking the differential of the both sides in the equation y2p = x
3
p+axp+b;
we find t = (3 x
2
p a)
2yp
.
2. Then, xz = t2   2xp.
3. Then, yz = yp + t (xz   xp).
2.3.5 Scalar Multiplication
In ECC, scalar point multiplication is the main cryptographic operation. Scalar
multiplication is basically to multiply a point P with a scalar k to calculate a point
Q. One way of calculating the scalar multiplication is through addition of P by
itself k times. However, this approach is not feasible in a cryptographic case,
because scalars are too big in order to satisfy the security needs. Therefore, it
is computationally infeasible to calculate a scalar multiplication only using point
addition. In order to calculate the scalar multiplication in a feasible time Double-
and-Add Algorithm is used:
Algorithm 4 reduces the time complexity of the scalar point multiplication
from O
 
k

to O
 
log2 k

. This time reduction makes scalar multiplication feasi-
ble, which makes usage of elliptic curves in cryptography possible.
2.3.6 Order of an Elliptic Curve Group
A point in an elliptic curve group can generate all or a subgroup of the elliptic
curve group points by scalar multiplication. The smallest scalar value in a scalar
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Algorithm 4 Scalar Multiplication
Input: P = Point to be multiplied
k = Scalar value to multiply point
Output: Q = kP; output of the scalar multiplication
Q 0
for i = m! 0 do
Q 2 Q (point doubling)
if ki == 1 then
Q Q+ P (point addition)
end if
end for
return Q
multiplication that results in point of infinity is the order of that point. The order
of a point is cryptographically important, since it gives the number of points that
a point can generate in the group. For cryptographic purposes, the order of a point
must be large enough.
The order of a point is defined by the prime factors of number of points that
satisfies the curve equation. If total number of points satisfies the equation is
a prime number then the order of the point is that prime number. However, if
the total number of points on a curve is a composite number, then order of a
point is one of the prime factors or any multiplicative combination of those prime
numbers. Therefore, oder of a point should be prime and a large number, so that
the system can be cryptographically secure.
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2.3.7 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
The security of the Elliptic Curve Cryptography depends on the hardness of solv-
ing discrete logarithm problem in elliptic curve group. The discrete logarithm
problem can be defined on an elliptic curve as follows:
1. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over finite field Fq.
2. Find a point P element of E.
3. Take a scalar number l and compute Q = l P .
4. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is finding l when P and Q are
given.
The order of the scalar l should be large enough in bit sizes so that it should
be infeasible to compute l. Therefore, in cryptographic applications a curve with
a large prime order is chosen so that the points’ orders are also large primes.
Many well known protocols are implemented on elliptic curves using Discrete
Logarithm Problem. One of the many algorithms is Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
[EDCH] Protocol which will be descried in detail in the section 2.3.8.
2.3.8 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EDCH is a protocol to set a shared secret between two parties over an insecure
channel using elliptic curves. The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman protocol realized
as follows:
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1. Alice and Bob uses an elliptic curve E and a point P on E.
2. Alice selects a private scalar ka, and calculates kaP and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob selects a private scalar kb, and calculates kbP and sends it to Alice.
4. Bob takes kaP and calculates kb(kaP ) = Qb.
5. Alice takes kbP and calculates ka(kbP ) = Qa.
6. kb(kaP ) = ka(kbP )! Qb = Qa, so Alice and Bob shares a secret.
7. Eve only learns kaP and kbP by eavesdropping.
Alice and Bob can use the x coordinate of the shared secret as a key or it can
be used to create a key for symmetric encryption. Although Eve can eavesdrop on
values of E;P; kaP and kbP , she cannot calculate ka and kb using kaP , kbP and
P , since doing so necessitates solving ECDL in a feasible amount of time.
2.4 Huff Curves
Huff curves are introduced by Huff [11] in 1948 as a new form of elliptic curves.
Every elliptic curve, which contains points that are order of 2 and 4 (Z=4Z 
Z=2Z), can be mapped to a Huff Curve. In other words, an elliptic curve, which
holds points with the order of 2 and 4 is isomorphic [17] to a Huff Curve. The
form of a Huff curve is as follows:
ax(y2   1) = by(x2   1) where a2 6= b2 and a; b 6= 0 (6)
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Huff curves have both advantageous and disadvantageous properties over el-
liptic curves. Usage of Huff curves is beneficial since, Joye et al. [13] proposed
an efficient unified addition formula that can also be used for doubling operations.
The design of a new hardware is not needed for the doubling operations and thus
hardware area is smaller. Another advantage of the Huff Curve is that the addition
formula does not depend on the curve parameters. Every point addition operation
for any curve equation can be calculated through the same addition formula with-
out changing any parameters. Therefore, parameters of the curve equation can be
changed easily without the need of setting new parameters in the hardware. Huff
curves are disadvantageous since, they need more arithmetic operations to calcu-
late point addition and doubling than elliptic curves do. Like in most cases, the
usage of the Huff curve should be determined by the time-memory trade-off.
2.4.1 Huff Curve Point Addition/Doubling
Point addition for points in a Huff curve is calculated as follows:
1. P1, P2 are two points that are elements of the curve.
2. Lets, y = lx +m be line passing through points P1(x1; y1) and P2(x2; y2)
that intersects with a third point  P3( x3; y3).
3. We can calculate the slope l = y1 y2
x1 x2 andm = y1  mx1
4. ax(y2   1) = by(x2   1) ! ax((lx + m)2   1) = b(lx + m) (x2  
1) by using y = lx+m
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5. We can obtain:
(a) x3 = x1 + x2 +
m(2al b)
l(al b)
(b) y3 = lx3  m
6. If we expand and simplify the formula, when x1x2 6= 1 and y1y2 6=  1:
(a) x3 =
(x1+x2) (1+y1y2)
(1+x1x2) (1 y1y2)
(b) y3 =
(y1+y2) (1+x1x2)
(1 x1x2) (1+y1y2)
Unlike in an elliptic curve the cases where x1 = x2 or y1 = y2 will not cause
the divider to be zero. Therefore, the addition formula can also be used for point
doubling by adding the point to itself.
2.5 Pollard Rho Attack
Pollard Rho Algorithm [30] is basically an integer factorization algorithm in-
vented by John Pollard in 1975. However, its method can also be used in the
calculation of discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves. The algorithm is
based on finding a collusion using a random-walk in a cyclic group. The algo-
rithm selects a random starting point and calculates the next point with a random
function. Calculations of points create a tail first and as the calculations con-
tinue they will form a cycle which will result in a collusion that will help to solve
ECDLP. Figure 3 shows progress of the calculation on a random-walk.
The algorithm needs fewer number of point calculations than its order to find
collusion because of the birthday paradox. Collusion can be found in (n=2)
1
2 + c
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Figure 3: Point Behaviour
calculations on average, where n is the order of the point on the elliptic curve and
c is a constant for calculation of the points on the tail.
The original algorithm takes into account only single thread of calculation
without parallelism. However, Oorschot and Wiener [27] proposed a parallel ver-
sion of the algorithm. Even though collusion still can be calculated with same
amount of point calculations, the calculations can be divided into multiple pro-
cesses with a linear decrease in the calculation time with each number of pro-
cesses. Using the parallel algorithm, collusion can be found in (n=2)
1
2
W
+ c cal-
culations by each process, where W is the number of processes. The Figure 4
depicts the calculation of the points and finding a collusion on a parallel Pollard
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Rho attack.
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Figure 4: Parallel Point Collusion Calculation
The generic algorithm for multiprocess Pollard Rho attack is shown in Algo-
rithm 5. In the algorithm random function for the random walk can be set to any
random function which can be decided according to the specifications or limita-
tions of the platforms. The importance of the selection of the random function
and distinguished point property, which is used in the Pollard Rho Algorithm, is
described in the sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
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Algorithm 5 Pollard Rho Attack Algorithm
Inputs: P 2 E(Fp)
l = Scalar to multiply point P
n = ord(P )
Q = l P
W = Number of total processors
Outputs: l; which is the discrete logarithm problem l = logpQ
Select a random function G that takes a point
as input and creates a random point
for i = 0! W   1 do
ci = rand() mod n
di = rand() mod n
end for
for each processor do
Compute a random point Ri  ci P + di Q
while No Point Collusion in the database do
if Ri is a distinguished point then
Store (Ri; ci; di) in the database
end if
Ri  G(Ri); ci  g(ci); di  g(di)
end while
end for
if Any Point collusion found; where Rj == Rk and ck 6= ck then
l (cj ck)
(dk dj) mod N
else
Rerun the algorithm
end if
return l
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2.5.1 Distinguished Point Property
The Pollard Rho Attack Algorithm is basically based on finding a collusion of two
points with different coefficients (i.e. Rj = Rl ! cjP + djQ = clP + dlQ). This
is achieved by adding all the calculated points into a database and running a search
algorithm to find a collusion. However, this approach is impractical since the total
number of points to be calculated is (n=2)
1
2 + c where n is the order. This ne-
cessitates huge storage requirements to perform a successful attack. For instance,
in the attack c; d; x; y values are stored and they require a space of 80 bytes for
160 bit field. In practical applications, n should be at least 160 bit for a sufficient
level of security, where the attack reduces its security level approximately to 80
bit. This will create a storage requirement of 280  80 bytes to perform the at-
tack, which is practically impossible. Even in a case where the security level is
30 bit, the attack requires 80 gigabytes of space. In addition to the huge space re-
quirement, communication between the database and the processes and collusion
search will also create prohibitively huge overhead.
Overcoming the problem of huge space requirement is to add a distinguished
point property, which will decrease the throughput of the point calculation. The
addition of a distinguished point function will selectively send the points to the
database after the calculation of the points. Generally, the distinguished point
property is set to check if the most significant k-bit of a point is zero or not. It
is simple and efficient because it does not take much resources and comparison
is a fast process. Another benefit of this k bit comparison is that the ratio of the
reduction can be determined accordingly. The function searches for a k-bit pattern
in general case, therefor the points sent to the database will be reduced by a factor
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of 2k. In other words, the process will send points to the database approximately
after every 2k points calculation.
2.5.2 Random Function
A random function is needed to determine the coefficients in generating random
number (ei and di in ciQ + diP ). Pseudorandomness can also be used while
calculating points, but true randomness can give better results while finding dis-
tinguished points. In a pseudorandom case, the points may stay in a loop without
any distinguished points being calculated. However, if the function is truly ran-
dom then, the chance of such a case is very low. Although usage of a true random
function is more beneficial, it is complex to design such a function. A pseudoran-
dom function is easier to implement and it is more practical in terms of calculation.
There are different ways to implement pseudorandom functions. One of the sim-
plest and most common implementation is to use the two least significant bits of
the point R as selection inputs as shown in Algorithm 6.
Another approach, which also creates more random results, is to form a ta-
ble by selecting multiple, random c and d coefficients and computing multiple
R points. As in the Algorithm 6, depending on the size of the table the least
significant bits of R can be used as selection inputs for the table and R, c and
d can be updated by using the table. However, this approach has more storage
requirements, since a table of coefficients and points are stored. The storage re-
quirement may not be much of a problem in a software implementation, but it
may be problematic in small FPGAs. Therefore, the random function should be
selected depending on the platform features.
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Algorithm 6 Random Function
Inputs: Rin; P; Q; cin; din; N
Rin = Input Point; where Rin = Rink 1 ; Rink 2 ; : : : ; Rin1 ; Rin0
P = l Q; l is a scalar for the discrete logarithm problem
cin; din = coefficients for Rin
Outputs: Rout; where it is a calculated random point
cout; dout = coefficients for Rout
if Rin1 == 0 and Rin0 == 0 then
Rout  Rin + P ; cout = cin + 1
else if Rin1 == 0 and Rin0 == 1 then
Rout  Rin +Q; dout = din + 1
else
Rout  Rin +Rin; cout = cin + cin; dout = din + din
end if
return Rout; cout; dout
3 Programmable Logic Devices
Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs) are electronic circuits that are used for hard-
ware programming. Their functionalities are not fixed during their manufacturing,
users can program and configure them to implement any functionality later dur-
ing the usage. There are different types of PLDs and their usage area is different
from each other, due to their specifications. Among these different types of PLDs,
two of the important PLDs are Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and
Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLDs).
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3.1 FPGA
Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is an integrated circuit that is designed
to be configured after its production by using a Hardware Description Language
(HDL). Although FPGAs are also integrated circuits, they are different from application-
specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for their configurability property. ASICs op-
erate in much higher clock frequencies in contrast with the FPGAs, but FPGAs
have reconfiguration option changing the chip. Having a configuration option also
discards the manufacturing process of a chip and creates a rapid development, im-
plementation and production. Another benefit is availability of update for bugs or
additional features while the device is in the hand of end-users.
FPGAs contain logic blocks to be used for configuration and these blocks
can be used for creation of and, or , xor and other simple logic gates as well
as complex logical functions. FPGAs are richer in resource and can be used for
configuration of highly complex state machines, which is harder or impossible to
implement in other PLDs. In a configuration process of an FPGA, Look-Up Tables
(LUTs) of logic blocks are programmed. The LUTs are volatile. Therefore, in
every power loss reconfiguration of the FPGA is required. In most self-systems it
is achieved by dumping the configuration files in to Flash Memories from which
auto-configuration is performed on power-up.
3.1.1 Microblaze (Softcore)
Microblaze is a 32 bit soft-core processor that is designed by Xilinx for FPGAs.
The processor generally consists of a Local Memory Bus (LMB) for Block-RAM
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(BRAM) access and Processor Local Bus (PLB) for communication with the pe-
ripherals connected to Microblaze. Since it is a soft-core processor, it has the
flexibility of adjusting its specifications according to applications. For instance,
a cache can be added with a user defined size, its pipeline depth can be set as
3 or 5 stages by taking into account area-time ratio, memory management mod-
ules can be added to the buses to communicate with external storage devices (i.e.
external RAMs, flash drives), barrel shifter and floating point arithmetic unit can
also be added to improve time performance or any user hardware module can be
added through PLB for specific applications. These user hardware modules can
be controlled by software that runs on Microblaze. The availability of this op-
tion makes Microblaze a practical instrument to be used for hardware-software
co-development.
Microblaze’s architecture is suitable to be used with two types of RAMs. The
first one is the external RAMs, which are larger in capacity and have higher ac-
cess times. Microblaze can access the RAM using a memory controller module
and any code can be dumped inside of the RAM, from which it can be executed.
The second one is internal RAM, which is actually BRAM inside the FPGA. The
FPGA uses its resources and creates an interface to use the BRAMs of the FPGA
in Microblaze as an internal RAM. It still functions as a RAM with having the ad-
vantage of low access time. However, the BRAMs on the FPGAs are too limited
and the Microblaze’s internal RAM option generally limits to few KBytes. Hence,
internal RAMs cannot be an option to execute complex and high resource-oriented
codes Therefore, external RAMs are required in such cases.
Xilinx have a Software Development Kit (SDK) that enables the development
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of software applications for Microblaze. SDK offers a C/C++ programming plat-
form with built-in libraries for usage of the general purpose functions and control
of the Xilinx hardware modules that can be embedded into Microblaze. SDK uses
GNU toolchain for development of the software. Since software designs are more
flexible in contrast to hardware designs, it is easier to test, control and operate
hardware modules by a software interface. The platform shows two options for
software developments for different usages. The first one is a standalone software
development for simple software applications, which is advantageous for limited
memories. Another option that SDK provides is a small microlinux environment
for software development. It can provide more complicated software development
options such as threads, sockets and many other options by using a microlinux ker-
nel. However, the microlinux kernel creates an overhead on the codes, therefore it
needs more memory space to function, where in most designs this high memory
need is provided by external memory resources.
User hardware modules are generally implemented to improve performance
when the software implementations provide low level of performance. Although
hardware implementations have a higher performance, usage of these hardware
modules are harder without a proper interface. Microblaze can provide the in-
terface and can ease the control of the hardware module. The communication be-
tween the processor and hardware module is performed by a software program us-
ing the PLB. Microblaze provides the software-hardware interface in an effective
way. For instance, a hardware RSA engine might be connected to the Microblaze
and the inputs might be supplied to the engine by Microblaze. Microblaze basi-
cally executes the software and gets the input values from the software and writes
them to the internal registers of the hardware module, so that hardware will use
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those values as inputs. After hardware completes its process, it puts the outputs
in the registers and Microblaze takes the results from those registers. Therefore,
Microblaze can provide an easy interface to control the hardware to give inputs
and receive outputs in order to use the hardwares’ functionality.
3.1.2 Executable and Linkable Format for Microblaze
As mentioned in section 3.1.1 Microblaze can run software programs and it is
also capable of running a small kernel such as microlinux. It uses Executable and
Linkable Format (ELF) for its executable files. ELF format is suitable for Microb-
laze, since it is flexible and extensible as Microblaze. Any change or additions in
the Microblaze can be adapted also to the software level with additions to the ELF
specifications. An ELF have a file structure that consist of sections. The basic
sections are text, data, bss and rodata. The features of those basic sections are as
follows:
Text Section: It is the section where instructions of the executable code is placed.
It is used to read the instructions and perform the operations accordingly. It
covers a fixed size in the memory and it is a read-only section in most cases.
Data Section: It holds the initialized static and global variables.It uses a fixed
size in the memory. Since initialized data can be changed during the execu-
tion of the program, both read and write operations can be performed in the
section.
BSS Section: This section has a similar usage as data section. It stores the global
and static variables which are either initialized to zero or uninitialized.
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Rodata Section: This section includes variables that are declared as constants in
the program. The rodata section is also a read-only memory with a fixed
size.
Besides the basic sections, an ELF file contains other sections to handle dy-
namic memory operations in a program. These memory sections are called stack
and heap. Heap is used to handle dynamic memory that are dynamically allo-
cated during the execution of a program. Stack, on the other hand, is used to store
registers, return addresses and in many other situations where a Last-In-First-Out
(LIFO) data structure is needed. The heap and stack are consecutive sections in the
memory. Heap stores its data starting from higher address memory location and
stack stores its data starting from lower address memory location. Since hap and
stack are adjoined sections and they store the variables in the opposite direction,
an overflow may cause a distortion on the other section. Unlike basic segments
in an ELF file, heap and stack sizes are not fixed since they are used to handle
dynamic memory operations. Required size of a dynamic memory will change
form application to application and their size values should be set accordingly. In
Microblaze, using the SDK heap and stack sizes can be set to any value as long as
there is available area in the memory.
As an ELF file not always consists of basic segments, many other segments
can be added through the linker. These segments can be used to store specific data
or any part of the code segments. This flexibility is beneficial in Microblaze, since
important and frequently used functions can be stored in a specific segment and
those segments can be mapped to BRAMs. As explained in section 3.1.1 BRAMs
are too to hold complex programs, but they feature much faster access times com-
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pared to external RAMs. When most frequently used functions are executed from
BRAM, the time performance of the software program will be increased.
Microblaze uses virtual addresses for memory and register mapping. It assigns
a default starting address to BRAMs, external RAMs and flash memories. Those
virtual addresses are fixed values and they are used during the compilation of
software programs. Therefore, the segments in the ELF file should be mapped to
the right addresses. Otherwise, code execution will fail since the pointers will use
fixed addresses in memory operations. For instance, if the segments of the ELF
file is linked in the external RAM, where virtual address is 0x1C000000, the code
should be directly imported into the RAM starting from the address 0x1C000000.
3.2 CPLD
Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) is a PLD that is similar to FPGAs
with some differences. They have moderate amount of sea-of-gates to be config-
ured. Unlike FPGAs, they cannot be configured to implement highly complex de-
signs. Although they are much less powerful than FPGAs, they have non-volatile
configuration memory. It is beneficial since reconfiguration is not needed in a
power-loss. When power is on, it will automatically start its functionality; for ex-
ample a state machine will start from its initial state and perform its functionality.
Reconfiguration of electronic devices is not possible every time they are turned
off for end-users. Therefore, CPLDs play important role for in bootstrapping
electronic devices.
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3.3 Related Works
Huerta et al. [10] describes a parallel computation scheme using Microblazes.
They propose three different network topologies for message transmission be-
tween multiple Microblazes that are configured in a single FPGA. Their work
measures the communication overhead between the processors to calculate the
speedup and efficiency of the systems. Furthermore, the work contains an exper-
imental implementation of AES encryption/decryption algorithm to measure the
achieved increase in throughput by multi-core implementations. In their scheme,
the speedup of the system depends on the software parallelism using multiple
Microblazes and does not achieve any hardware parallelism. In other words a Mi-
croblaze based Multiprocessor architecture is used for speedup. Although, paral-
lelism is achieved in the software by multi-core, the frequency of the Microblazes
are lower compared to modern day CPUs, so the Microblaze based Multiproces-
sor may result in a lower performance compared to modern day CPUs. Another
drawback of the system is that it does not include the usage of multiple FPGAs
and their communication interface, so the design is only limited to a single FPGA
and the number of Microblazes that can be fit into the single FPGA.
Saldana et al. [1] proposes a TMD-MPI implementation for multiple embed-
ded processors across multiple FPGAs. This work also takes into account the soft-
ware parallelism using multiple Microblazes by a middle-ware application called
TMD-MPI. One of the advantages of their work is that TMD-MPI interface can be
used to control multiple FPGAs, so their work does not depend on a single FPGA
parallelism. The design still lacks of hardware parallelism to benefit which is im-
plemented in an extended version of their work in [33]. In the extended work, they
34
implemented the TMD-MPI interface to the x86 Intel processors and to the special
purpose hardware modules. Their design enables the usage of x86 Intel proces-
sors, Microblazes, Power-PC and special purpose hardware engines by a simple
software interface. The special purpose hardware modules are controlled by an in-
terface called TMD-MPE which is a hardware implementation. The TMD-MPE
is an interface between the spacial purpose hardware and the internal network
inside a single FPGA. The internal network of an FPGA is controlled with an
on-chip network interface for package distribution. Whenever a package is ad-
dressed to the special purpose hardware, the internal network passes the packages
to the TMD-MPE. The package contains data and message parameters and MPE
performs the desired function using the message parameters. Since TMD-MPI
contains large number of functions, TMD-MPE contains a small number of them
and it might not be able to perform every functionality that TMD-MPI needs.
The external network communication is sustained by an Off-Chip Communica-
tion Controller (OCCC) engine. Basically, every FPGA sends and receives the
packages via OCCC and forwards them to the on-chip network interface to be
distributed. Their scheme does not contain the dynamic configuration option of
the special purpose hardware modules. Therefore, the hardware designs should
be configured into FPGAs beforehand, in order to be used by the TMD-MPI in-
terface. Another drawback is that the design needs OCCC for every FPGA and
a TMD-MPE for every special purpose hardware modules which may be ineffi-
cient since, they may cover a large area in the FPGA. Also, FPGAs are connected
to a motherboard by Front-Side-Bus using an OCCC. If the total number of FP-
GAs exceeds a volume than the motherboard can hold, another Host PC should be
added to the system which increases the total cost of the system.
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Gu¨neysu et al. [7] proposes an FPGA cluster based special purpose hardware
to solve discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves. Their work focus on crypt-
analytic attacks by using special purpose architectures. The design is built to at-
tack and measure the security levels of the elliptic curves. The attack is performed
by using a special purpose hardware for elliptic curve point addition and a Host
PC to manage the control of the hardware designs. Unlike the previous paper in
[33], the design does not aim to build a generic architecture for hardware control.
However, the work is similar in sense of having a Host PC as the controller and
the FPGAs as the work horses. The Host PC is used to send/receive data and to
form a database to perform the ECDLP attack. The possibility of hardware accel-
eration is shown with the work, but it does not contain any protocol for dynamic
configuration option for the FPGAs and it does not contain a generic architecture
to control multiple FPGAs for massive computations.
In [6] and [8] Gu¨neysu et al. present cryptographic and cryptanalytic works on
a special machine called COPACOBANA. COPACOBANA is a machine that is
consists of 120 Spartan-3e1000 FPGAs that are connected to a Host-PC by using
an FPGA interface. The Host-PC uses software libraries to control and configure
the FPGAs which ease the control of the machine. The machine is specifically de-
signed for high performance computing in any field of science where computation
power is essential. The papers basically focus on efficient hardware architectures
and use the parallelism of the FPGAs to measure the security levels of widely
used security algorithms like DES, 3DES, AES, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature,
etc. The COPACOBANA machine is moderate in price-performance ratio when
compared to computers which have same level of computation power. Although
it has a moderate price-performance ratio, it is still an expensive device to obtain.
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In this thesis, we try to eliminate the disadvantages of the proposed systems
and create an FPGA-cluster with an ease of control mechanism. In Huerta et
al. and Saldana et al. the proposed systems either use only Microblazes for par-
allelism or uses communication interfaces for the hardware engines. We try to
eliminate the software parallesim, since hardware parallelism is better, and the
interfaces for the communications, because they will utilize area in the FPGAs.
We try to take advantage of the software control like TMD-MPI architecture in
Saldana et al. with additions of having reconfigurability options on the FPGAs.
Gu¨neysu et al. tries to measure the security levels of the widely sued algorithms
with a high priced device, but it is not always possible to purchase such devices.
Our work aims to use the low level FPGAs to form clusters and estimate the secu-
rity levels of the algorithms based on the speed of the performed attacks.
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4 General Overview of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we give details on the proposed architecture for FPGA cluster,
our scheme and its operational steps, usage of FPGA cluster for acceleration of
cryptographic computations and cryptanalysis.
4.1 Proposed Architecture for FPGA cluster
The architectural overview of the FPGA cluster we use in our work is depicted in
Figure 5. Since our architecture uses TCP/IP for communication, any FPGA board
connected to the Internet can be a part of our cluster and individually accessed
from anywhere in the network.
CLUSTER HEAD
FPGA-1
FPGA-2
FPGA-3
ROUTER
Figure 5: General overview of the FPGA cluster
Our aim is to create a platform consisting of various hardware and software
components that can be used for time- and resource-consuming tasks with a spe-
cific emphasis on cryptologic applications. The application we target is of the type
where direct interprocess communication is not necessary such as exhaustive key
search.
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As pointed out earlier, our goal is to harness especially the computation power
of inexpensive FPGA boards for the use in cryptologic applications. Therefore,
we use Spartan-3E Starter Kit board, which is one of the basic equipment used
in logic design courses. A Spartan-3E Starter Kit [38] is a board that consists
of the following hardware components: i) volatile programmable unit (FPGA -
XC3S500E), ii) a nonvolatile programmable unit (CPLD - XC2C64A), iii) 128
Mbit parallel flash memory, iv) 64 MB DDR SDRAM (MT46V32M16), v) Stan-
dard Microsystems LAN83C185 10/100 Ethernet physical layer (PHY) interface
and vi) a RJ-45 connector. In what follows, we give details of these components
and how we utilize them in our cluster.
FPGA: Spartan-3E Starter Kit features an FPGA chip [36] (XC3S500E) of
500K equivalent gates.
For flexibility, we adopt a configuration scheme so that a user not only sends
computation tasks to FPGA device, but also configures it remotely via Internet.
By configuration, we mean sending small software applications that will run on
the softcore as well as configuring hardware resources for the actual computation.
These software applications function as proxies, which handle the communication
with the cluster head to receive jobs and deal with other management tasks. The
softcore (MicroBlaze) is a 32-bit RISC processor which can be implemented on
an FPGA device using the general-purpose configurable logic.
CPLD: Unlike FPGA, CPLD configuration is not lost when the power is
switched off. Thus, it can be used to implement a state machine that will bootstrap
the device and perform simple configuration steps such as loading the softcore to
the FPGA during the startup. The CPLD plays an essential role in configuration
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switch operation as well.
Storage Units - SDRAM and Parallel Flash: Two types of storage de-
vices on the Spartan-3E Starter Kit play an important role in our application. The
first one is a 512 Mbit DDR RAM (MT46V32M16), which is a volatile memory
(hereafter referred as SDRAM) used mainly for running our proxy codes. The
second one is a 128 Mbit (16 MB) Intel Strata Flash parallel NOR Flash PROM
(JS28F128-J3D75), which is used for storing configuration files of the softcore
and hardware for the computation, proxy code, and finally the computation re-
sults in some cases. We will refer this non-volatile memory as the parallel flash.
The utilized components on the FPGA board are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Components of the FPGA board
For flexibity and transparency purposes, the proposed infrastructure is de-
signed as a self-configuring system, which becomes ready for remote configu-
ration once it is connected to the Internet. In addition, multi-configuration tech-
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nology allows to switch between configurations dynamically.
The CPLD controls the most significant four bits of the address lines of the
parallel flash as shown in Figure 6 allowing it to store up to 16 different config-
uration files in the parallel flash. The multi-configuration technology is available
in many FPGA devices.
4.2 Our Scheme and Its Operational Steps
Our scheme can be understood better if the following four key steps of its opera-
tion are explained in detail as follows:
Softcore Configuration: The FPGA device is expected to start automatically
and become ready for remote configuration through the network when the device
is turned on. For this, the configuration bit stream of the softcore is stored at ad-
dress (0x000000)1 of the parallel flash and the CPLD is configured with a state
machine which will help to configure FPGA automatically. The memory map of
the parallel flash illustrated in Figure 7 shows the exact location of the configura-
tion file for the softcore.
Following the softcore configuration, a special program called boot-loader is
executed by the softcore.
Execution of Boot-loader: The boot-loader is a small piece of code, which
comes as a part of configuration file of the softcore and stored in internal Block
RAM (BRAM) of the FPGA. It is responsible of moving the proxy code (cf.
1We use 24-bit address for the parallel flash.
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0x000000
0x100000
Proxy Code
Microblaze Configuration Bitstream
Hardware Configuration Bitstream
0x300000
0x400000
0xFFFFFF
Available for 
User 
Configuration
Figure 7: Memory map of the parallel flash and placement of configuration and
data
0x010000 in Figure 7) from the parallel flash to the SDRAM since the latter is
too large to fit in the internal BRAM.
Execution of Proxy for Implementing Client/Server CommunicationModel:
To assign tasks, the cluster head communicates with FPGA boards using reliable
TCP/IP protocols which are implemented by the proxy code on the softcore side.
In our communication model, the cluster head and the softcore plays the roles of
server and clients interchangeably.
Automatic, Remote Configuration of FPGA Device and Configuration
Switch: The actual computations for specific tasks are performed by hardware
implementations, optimized for FPGA devices. Once the configuration file for a
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hardware implementation is available, the cluster head can send it through net-
work to the FPGA device. The proxy code running on the softcore is responsible
of receiving the hardware configuration file and storing it in the parallel flash (cf.
address of 0x300000 of the parallel flash in Figure 7).
The cluster head can send commands to the softcore to perform write, read,
erase and configure operations. A write command can be used to up-
load a configuration file for a specific hardware to the parallel flash. Then, the
configure command is used to configure the FPGA with this hardware. Be-
fore configuration of the hardware, the softcore can be removed from the FPGA
to use its space for the former. Naturally, when the computation by the hard-
ware is finished, the FPGA device should be re-configured back to the softcore.
However, the hardware will need to relay the results of the computation to the
softcore before its re-configuration. The results are written in a specific location
in the parallel flash, whose address is sent to the softcore with the configure
command.
More precisely, configuration switch necessitates the execution of the the fol-
lowing steps in this order: i) Communication 1: the softcore receives input data
and stores it in the parallel flash, ii) Configuration switch 1: the softcore is re-
moved and the hardware is loaded in the FPGA, iii) Computation: The hardware
works on the task, and writes the results to the parallel flash iv) Configuration
switch 2: The hardware is removed and the softcore is loaded in the FPGA, v)
v) Communication 2: the softcore reads the results from the parallel flash, and
sends them to the cluster head.
Alternatively, especially for applications and FPGAs where the area overhead
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of the softcore is not important, the hardware design and the softcore can run
simultaneously in FPGA, which eliminates the need for configuration switch as
described above. In subsequent sections, we will demonstrate applications that
benefit from the configuration switch.
4.3 Using FPGACluster for Acceleration of Cryptographic Com-
putations
A simple and inexpensive FPGA device such as Spartan-3 running at a low clock
frequency of 119 MHz can perform an RSA exponentiation operation in about
8 ms using 1553 slices and 10 hardwired multipliers [26]2. Similarly, the same
FPGA device can achieve an encryption rate of 429 Mbps for the AES standard
block cipher algorithm using only 103 slices at 161 MHz [9]. Since the FPGA
device can realize more than one block of AES encryption engine, it is possi-
ble to reach much higher throughput values for encryption operation either using
multi-message encryption techniques or a suitable working mode (e.g. counter
mode). Therefore, using simple, inexpensive FPGA clusters can be cost-effective
alternatives for accelerating cryptographic operations.
When the configuration switch is not used, cryptographic operations can be
overlapped with the communication. In other words, as the softcore receives the
new requests for cryptographic operation the hardware can perform the calcula-
2Note that RSA timings for one signature operation vary between 0.15 ms and 8 ms on a PC
depending on the processor (cf. http://bench.cr.yp.to/results-sign.html). In order to obtain accel-
eration over common PCs, a larger FPGA device that can accommodate more than one instance
of crypto unit should be used. Otherwise, many FPGA boards will be needed to outperform PC
implementations.
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tions for old requests simultaneously. The biggest problem in using inexpensive
FPGA boards as cryptographic accelerators is that the softcore consumes a signif-
icant portion of FPGA resources leaving only a fraction of them for cryptographic
computations. For example, while we can accommodate several AES encryp-
tion/decryption blocks [9] on a Spartan-3E along with the softcore, an RSA circuit
may not co-exist with the softcore in our FPGA device. Therefore, in RSA case
we may need to switch between RSA circuit and the softcore configurations.
During the configuration switch, the SDRAM loses its content since it is es-
sentially a dynamic memory and needs refreshment operations in regular periods
due to the fact that data stored as charges decays in time. Therefore, the only way
the softcore and the hardware can communicate is through writing to the paral-
lel flash memory. Writing data to the parallel flash, on the other hand, is a very
slow operation compared to the execution time of the cryptographic operation for
the same data. Consequently, cryptographic acceleration through a simple FPGA
board may not be feasible if configuration switching is needed as in the case of
RSA circuit. In Section 5, we provide a scenario where cryptographic accelera-
tion may be possible even in the case of configuration switch. But, block cipher
acceleration is always possible since the FPGA device can be shared between the
softcore and the hardware.
4.4 Using FPGA Cluster for Cryptanalysis
Depending on the cryptographic algorithm, different cryptanalytic attack meth-
ods and algorithms are proposed. For recent block cipher algorithms, perhaps
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the most successful attack method is exhaustive search, which relies on trying
out all keys. Exhaustive search or more precisely the effectiveness of exhaustive
search made possible through our computational ability also provides a reliable
metric for security of many cryptographic algorithms. We tend to quantify the
difficulty of breaking cryptographic algorithms in terms of the difficulty of ex-
haustive search (more precisely the number of basic operations we perform in an
exhaustive search) [21, 24, 4]. This is due to the fact that we perform an eventual
exhaustive search within a reduced set of secret key candidates in many cryptana-
lytic attack methods.
Most cryptanalytic algorithms can be adjusted to alleviate the time overhead
incurred in inter-process communication between the cluster head and the FPGA
boards. Both designs in [7] for exhaustive key search and [8] for solving discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) rely on a massively parallel computer of inexpensive
FPGA devices as the computational work horses. Exhaustive key search is one of
the easiest cryptanalytic problems to parallelize since each FPGA device can run
in isolation for a very long period of time that is adjustable with the size of the
search interval. Also, as stated in [8], certain computations in the Pollard’s Rho
method [31, 28] for solving elliptic curve DLP (ECDLP) can be so adjusted to
meet any bandwidth restriction between the cluster head and the FPGA boards.
For instance, in an exhaustive search for an AES key using the implementation
in [9], one AES block (103 slices) can try approximately 3.3 million key candi-
dates in one second. In a single computation task submitted to an FPGA, which
takes about one minute, one additional AES block implemented on the FPGA
resources gained by removing the softcore can try out an extra 200 million key
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candidates. This value commensurates with the number of AES instances that can
fit in the space saved through removing the softcore. Since the communication
between the cluster head and FPGA device is not intense (in fact only the key
interval is needed to be communicated to the FPGA), overlapping communication
and computation would not help. Therefore, in such cases it is always beneficial
to apply the configuration switch.
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5 Implementation and Experimental Results
In this section, we provide some implementation details and experimental results
to evaluate the true potential of the proposed FPGA cluster for cryptologic com-
putations. We start by giving the required resources to implement the softcore
in Spartan-3E (XC3S500E) devices, which consumes 4,270 out of 9,312 (45%)
4-input LUTs and occupies 3,526 out of 4,656 (75%) slices. The utilization per-
centage for such a small FPGA device is relatively high and leaving limited con-
figurable FPGA resources for the hardware unit that will perform the actual com-
putation. While the remaining resources are significant in implementing many
instances of block cipher algorithms, the public key algorithms may not be imple-
mented in a low end FPGA device. This is, in fact, one of the primary motivations
for the scheme that will allow an efficient configuration switch between the soft-
core and the hardware unit.
In our experiments, we used a Linux-based PC (cluster head) and ASUS RT-
N13U router in addition to multiple Spartan-3E boards. We used Verilog for all
hardware designs and C/C++ language for software components on the softcore
and the cluster head.
5.1 Software Implementations
In this section, we give detailed information on the software implementations for
both the softcore and cluster head.
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5.1.1 Bootloader
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1 softcore can run both standalone and linux appli-
cations that are written in C/C++ language. However, it is not always possible to
fit the entire code into BRAM of the softcore, especially linux applications, since
the BRAM sizes of the softcores are generally too small. Therefore, codes, which
requires huge amount of storage, are executed from SDRAM. To this end, a boot-
loader application is used. The bootloader can be embedded into the BRAM of the
softcore and the configuration file of the softcore can be updated with the informa-
tion in the BRAM. When the softcore is configured using the configuration file,
the bootloader application is also imported to the FPGA. Once the configuration
is completed, the softcore starts its execution from the BRAM, and the bootloader
application starts. The job of the bootloader is to copy the proxy code to SDRAM
and start its execution. For the bootloader to perform the operations, the proxy
code is put into a file format (referred to as proxy-file-format henceforth) which
is described in detail in section 5.1.3. The bootloader uses the following steps to
start the execution of the proxy code:
1. The bootloader reads the header of the proxy-file-format from a specific
offset3 from the flash driver. This header contains necessary information to
copy and run the proxy code. The structure of the header is given in table 1.
2. The bootloader copies the proxy code from the flash to the SDRAM using
the size of the proxy code to allocate sufficient storage for the proxy.
3In our case, offset of the flash is 0x100000
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Elements of the Structure Vector Memory Addresses Size(In Bytes)
in the Softcore
Size of the Proxy Code - 4
Reset Vector 0x00000000-0x00000004 4
User Exception Vector 0x00000008-0x0000000C 4
Interrupt Vector 0x00000010-0x00000014 4
Break Point Vector 0x00000018-0x0000001C 4
Hardware Exception Vector 0x00000020-0x00000024 4
3. The bootloader sets the reset, exception and interrupt vector values of the
proxy code in the softcore to start its execution. These vectors are impor-
tant to start the execution flow of the proxy code correctly. The values of
the vectors differ in each application and they are also different in the boot-
loader and the proxy code, since the bootloader uses the virtual addresses
of the BRAM and the proxy code uses the virtual addresses of the SDRAM.
If the values are not set correctly before launching the proxy application,
the execution flow of the proxy code will be damaged in the first exception
or interrupt event. The features of these vector values is as in the follow-
ing: Reset Vector: It holds the first instruction to start the execution. When
the softcore is started or a reset operation is performed, the instructions
starts fetching from the reset vector whose address is 0x00000000. User-
Hardware Exception Vectors: These vectors are used to handle software
exceptions and hardware exceptions. The causes of the software exceptions
is to the running program on the softcore. The hardware exceptions are gen-
erally caused by situations like illegal instructions, instructions and data bus
errors and many other hardware related errors. These exception vectors are
used to handle exception problems by storing the memory address of the
problem, jumping to necessary functions to handle the exception and per-
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forming further operations to continue the execution flow correctly. Inter-
rupt Vectors: The interrupt vector is used to handle the interrupts occurred
by the hardware peripherals. In an interrupt operation, the return address
of the execution is stored in the registers and jumps to the interrupt vec-
tor to execute the handling process. Later, the address is restored from the
registers to continue execution flow.
4. The bootloader resets the internal registers of the softcore to prevent any
disturbance that may occur due to the stored values in the registers.
5. The bootloader resets the Program Counter (PC) of the softcore to start the
execution flow from the beginning. Because the bootloader resets to the
value of the reset vector, the processor directly jumps to execute the proxy
code from the SDRAM.
5.1.2 Cluster-Head
In our work, we want to form an FPGA cluster in which FPGAs can be used
in their full potentials with an easy control mechanism. In order to create an
easy control mechanism, developing a software library was crucial to handle the
communication and manage the FPGAs. Since software programs are easier to
develop and more flexible relative to hardware designs, we developed a C/C++
software library for the control mechanism. In the development of the software
library, we aimed to create middleware services between the cluster-head and the
FPGAs in order to use the cluster-head as the data manager and controller, while
FPGAs are used as workhorses. The software library is designed to work on
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Linux operating system and it uses TCP/IP socket to handle the communication
and Posix-Thread library to handle thread applications. In the following, details
of the software library structure will be explained and the protocols between the
cluster-head and FPGAs will be given:
Software Library Structure
The software library is formed in a hierarchy of structures to store information
on FPGAs and manage the communication. In the low level, the library holds
a structure called FPGA Structure that stores information about a single FPGA.
The FPGA Structure contains information on network, socket, thread, data and
flags for an FPGA. The detailed information on the structures is below:
• Network Structure: The network structure holds the information about the
IP address of the FPGA and input-output port numbers, which are used in
the communication process.
• Socket Structure: The cluster-head will run both a server and a client ap-
plication. The structure holds the socket numbers for both applications.
• Thread Structure: The threads are used to parallelize the communications
and handle server and client applications simultaneously. For that purpose,
applications requires the usage of thread indexes, locks and signals which
will be described in detail in Software Library Protocols.
• Data Structure: The data structure holds information about the offset and
size of the data which will be sent to the FPGA or received from the FPGA.
It also contains pointers to sending/receiving data.
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• Flag Structure: The flags are set to handle usage of server and client ap-
plications without a conflict in the cluster-head. The flags contain the fol-
lowing information on the FPGA: whether the FPGA is server or client,
connected or not and busy or not.
While the library has a structure FPGA Structure in the low level implemen-
tation to store information for an FPGA, a class FPGAS Class is implemented,
using the FPGA Structure, in the upper level to create functions to control the
FPGAs. This class is used to create applications for distributed computing in the
FPGAs which is serving as a middleware application. The FPGAS Class holds the
FPGA Structure as a linked list and any number of FPGAs can be added to the
list at any time in the application. Any FPGA Structure in the list can be selected
by an index to access its information. Usage of indexes helps to set information
for every FPGA separately which is useful while assigning different tasks for each
FPGA.
Software Library Protocols
As the first step, a server application need to be started in the cluster-head to
handle the data exchange in a configuration switch operation. Before any connec-
tions are performed by the cluster-head, the IP and port numbers of the FPGAs
should be entered. After that, any connection request can be sent to the FPGAs as
a client. After a connection is established, any read, write, erase or configuration
operations can be requested from the FPGAs. The details of the operations are
given in the following:
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• Erase Operation: In an erase operation, the informations sent to the FP-
GAs are erase command, offset and size of the flash memory need to be
erased. When the job request is completed, the FPGA sends an acknowl-
edgement to the cluster-head, so the cluster-head continues to execute its
application.
• Read Operation: A read operation may be a time consuming operation in
some cases. Therefore, rather than communicating with a single FPGA at
a time, a thread application is created in order to receive data from mul-
tiple FPGAs in parallel. Before starting the read operation, the size and
the offset values of the memory area which will be read should be set in
the FPGA Structure structure. Then, the necessary memory should be al-
located, using the receive pointer in the FPGA Structure to store the re-
ceiving data from the FPGA. When the read operation is executed for a
specific FPGA, a thread application is started. This application sends the
read command, offset and size information to the FPGA. Then, the cluster-
head receives the data in chunks of 0x400 Bytes and to synchronize the
communication, for every received chunk an acknowledgement is sent to
the FPGA. This process continues until all the data is received from the
FPGA and after that the data can be accessed from the allocated memory.
The visualization of protocol of the read operation is illustrated in Figure
8. The usage of threads creates an asynchronous communication between
the FPGA and cluster-head. In other words, while a read operation is oc-
curring for an FPGA, other operations may also continue on other FPGAs.
Although asynchronous communication is useful to fasten the processes and
to run the FPGAs in parallel, a problem may occur if the read operation is
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not finished while the data is required for an operation in the cluster-head.
The problem is handled using signals in the thread which will be described
in detail inWaiting Operation.
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Figure 8: The Protocol of Read Operation
• Write Operation: The write operation is similar to the read operation. Be-
fore starting the operation, size and offset values of the memory area which
will be written should be set in the FPGA Structure. Later, the necessary
memory should be allocated, using the send pointer in the FPGA Structure,
to store the sending data. After the allocation, the data should be copied into
the allocated memory so that a writing operation can be performed. Similar
to a read operation, a write operation opens a thread application and the data
can be sent in parallel while the cluster-head can continue to perform other
operations. In the protocol, the cluster-head sends the data in chunks of
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0x400 Bytes and for every chunk, it receives an acknowledgement from the
FPGA until all the data is sent to the FPGA. The visualization of the write
operation protocol is illustrated in Figure 9. Like in the read operation, the
write operation should be handled with a thread-safe method not to cause a
race condition between the threads. The problem is handled using signals
in the threads which will be described in detail inWaiting Operation.
Read Command - Oset - Size
Data (0x400 Bytes)
Acknowledgement
C
lu
st
e
r-
H
e
a
d S
o
ftco
re
Acknowledgement
Data (0x400 Bytes)
Acknowledgement
Data (0x400 Bytes)
Acknowledgement
Figure 9: The Protocol of Write Operation
• Configuration Switch Operation: As described in Section 4.2, in a con-
figuration switch event, the result of the hardware process, will be sent back
to the cluster-head. In order to perform the operation, the server applica-
tion on the cluster-head should be started in the first place. Then the, offset
and size values of the resulting data and configuration command are sent
to the FPGA. Later, the operation continues by closing the connection with
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the FPGA. After the connection is closed, the cluster-head continues to run
its other operations, while its server application waits to receive the results.
When the FPGA is connected to the server of the cluster-head, which means
that hardware operation finished its job and ready to send the results, the
cluster-head searches the IP address of the connected device from the linked
list and opens a receiving application thread to receive the results. Since it is
a thread application, the main part of the application may need to await the
results to use them afterwards. This situation is handled like the write and
read operation which will be described in detail inWaiting Operation.
• Waiting Operation: Since the library aims to control the FPGA clusters in
parallel to perform read, write and configuration switch operations, it needs
a thread handling function to prevent race conditions and create thread-safe
applications using the library. Therefore, we added aWAIT function to the
library to create thread-safe applications. The function is used for waiting
an operation that should complete its execution before the other operations
can continue. It checks the client/server, busy and connected flags in order
to decide whether the FPGA is doing a configuration switch or read/write
operation. Once the decision is made, the function waits for the selected
operation to complete its process. After the operation is completed, the
function finishes its waiting condition and the application continues to exe-
cute.
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5.1.3 Proxy Code
The softcore contains a large complex software application (the proxy code) to
perform the tasks that are sent from the cluster-head. The proxy code is put into
a file format for the bootloader to start it. In our setup, all proxy code instruc-
tions are executed from the SDRAM and its virtual address is used in the process.
Converting the program to a file format is realized with the following steps:
1. The proxy code is compiled and an ELF file is formed.
2. The ELF file is converted into a binary file(referred as input-binary hence-
forth), where the sections of the ELF file are mapped into their virtual ad-
dress.
3. From the input-binary file, size of the proxy code, reset, user exception,
interrupt, break point and hardware exception vectors are copied into an
output binary file (referred as output-binary henceforth).
4. From the input-binary file, all the instructions are copied to the output-
binary file and the file format is ready to be transferred into the flash to
be started by the bootloader application.
When the bootloader starts the proxy code it performs some steps to com-
municate with the cluster-head and waits for tasks to perform. As the first step
the proxy code initializes the network peripherals to make available the network
interface for communication. Then, it sets the MAC and IP addresses of the soft-
core which should be set differently for every softcore in the network. After that,
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the proxy code is ready to run the protocol with the cluster-head. The protocol
between the cluster-head and the proxy code is required to perform both server
and client applications in both sides. A server/client state bit is stored in the flash
memory to keep track of the proxy is acting as a server or client. When the proxy
runs a server process, the following process is executed:
1. The proxy code reads the status register from the flash memory location to
decide whether to run client application or server application.
2. If the server application is started, which means there is not any job assigned
to the softcore, it waits for connection request from the cluster head.
3. When a connection request comes from the cluster-head, it accepts the con-
nection and performs the tasks that are given by the cluster-head. As de-
scribed in Section 4.2, these tasks can be writing, reading, erasing or and
configuration switch operations. A read and write operation in flash mem-
ory is a costly operation, so these operations are handled in large arrays. For
each operation, the protocol for the proxy code is as follows:
• Reading Operation: The cluster-head sends the offset and size of the
data that will be read from the flash memory. The proxy code allocates
0x50000 B of memory in the SDRAM. If the size does not exceeds
the allocated space, it stores all the data from the flash memory to the
allocated location in SDRAM and sends the data in chunks of 0x400
B to the cluster-head. In case when the size exceeds the allocated
memory, it stores the first 0x50000 bytes from the flash memory and
sends it to the cluster-head in chunks of 0x400 B. After 0x50000 B
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of data is sent, allocated space is used to store the second 0x50000
B of data. This process continues until the proxy-code sends all the
necessary data. After the task is finished, the allocated space is freed
to be used for later operations.
• Writing Operation: The cluster-head sends the offset and size of
the data that will be written to the flash memory. In order to write
in flash memories, the area should be erased with a erase operation
first. After the erasing the necessary memory, the proxy code allo-
cates 0x50000 bytes of memory from the SDRAM. Later, it receives
the data in chunks of 0x400 B from the cluster-head and stores it until
the allocated space is full. If the size does not exceed the allocated
space, the proxy code writes the data into the flash memory. In case,
where the size exceeds the allocated space, the proxy code stops re-
ceiving data when the allocated space is full and it writes all the data
in the allocated space to the flash memory. After the writing process
is completed, proxy code continues to receive the data since the allo-
cated memory is available. This process continue until all the data is
received and written into the flash memory.
• Erasing Operation: In flash memories the erasing operation can be
performed in the entire sector. Even to erase a few bytes of the memory
in the flash drive, the entire memory sector needs to be erased com-
pletely. In our case, Parallel Flash divided into sectors of 0x20000
bytes. In order to perform erase operation, the cluster-head sends the
size and offset of the erase operation. The proxy code calculates the
number of sectors that need to be erased. Later on, it performs erase
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operations for each sector.
• Configuration Switch Operation: As described in Section 4.2, the
cluster-head sends the configuration switch command along with the
offset and size values of the flash memory location that the hardware
process writes its results. The proxy code forms a status register for-
mat to write it into the flash memory for itself to use it in a config-
uration switch operation. The first byte of the status register holds
the client-server status information, which in our case, is set to client
state. The following 4 bytes holds the IP address of the cluster-head
and the last 8 bytes holds the offset and size information. After the
status register format is formed, it is copied into a specific part of the
flash 4. Then, the proxy code erases the flash memory starting from
the offset by the amount of size to make space in the flash memory
for the hardware to write its results. As the last step, the proxy code
closes its connection with the cluster-head and sends a bit-stream to
the CPLD to start configuration switch to configure the hardware.
After the hardware completes its job, it starts another configuration switch to
configure the softcore. This time when the proxy code starts, the client-server
status register holds the information to start the client application in the proxy
code. In the client case of the proxy code, the communication protocol between
the proxy code and cluster-head is explained in the following:
1. The proxy code reads the status register from the flash memory and runs the
client application.
4Address 0x60000 offset in our application
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2. Using the information in the status register, proxy code connects to the
server in the cluster-head.
3. The proxy code performs a reading operation and sends the results that is
obtained by the hardware to the cluster-head using the offset and size values
in the status register.
4. After the completion of the transmission, it erases the status register and
starts its server application to be ready for the future job requests.
5. When the server application is ready, it disconnects its client application
from the cluster-head.
5.2 Hardware Implementations
In this section, we give detailed information on the hardware implementations.
Our implementations use word blocks for storage, therefore arithmetic operations
are implemented to handle the data as a form of word blocks. Since our implemen-
tations are parametrized, bit size and word block size of the hardware architectures
can be set to any value. Therefore, they are flexible designs that are able to be used
in any architecture by changing their parameters. Since we are performing an at-
tack on 160-bit Huff curves, we set the bit size to 160 bits and the word block
number to 10.
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5.2.1 Inversion
In this section the hardware implementation of the Montgomery inversion will be
described in detail, which is mentioned in section 2.1.2. The Montgomery inver-
sion Algorithm aims to produceX 12m mod N as an output, for the operandX .
The algorithm consists of two phases which are given in Algorithm 2 and 3. In
the first phase, required inputs are the X as the inversion operand and N as the
modulus of the operation. The output of the first phase is: X 12k m mod N .
The first phase will run the while loop for k iterations. Every iteration in the
while loop is designed to finish the if-else statements in W + 1 clock cycles,
where W is the total number of word blocks, in our hardware implementation.
The total number of clock cycles to finish the while loop is: k  (W + 1). Af-
ter the while loop is finished in the first phase, the if statement at the end will
add W clock cycles to the overall timing. Therefore, the total number of clock
cycles to finish the phase one is: k  (W + 1) + W . When the first phase is
completed, it passes the X 12k m mod N and k to the second phase in oder
to compute the Montgomery inversion. The second phase is basically calculates
the multiplication of the given input by 22m k. Using the first phase’s outputs,
the second phase will calculate: X 12k m  22m k mod N , which will result in
X 12m mod N . In the second phase, the for loop will iterate 2m   k times. In
every iteration the calculation will takeW + 1 clock cycles and the total number
of clock cycles for the second phase will be (2m  k)  (W + 1). This will result
in the total number of clock cycles for the Montgomery inversion algorithm as
(2m  k)  (W + 1) + k  (W + 1) +W ! 2m  (W + 1) +W .
The implementation of the Montgomery inversion algorithm is a generic and
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flexible one. As mentioned before, the implementation can be set to any bit length
and word length for the desired usage. The algorithm is implemented by dividing
the hardware architecture into two main architectures which are named as u-v
architecture and r-s architecture. In the following the details of the architectures
are given:
• U-V Architecture: The most complex part of the architecture is the u  
v part, which is used to update u and v values in the algorithm and the
architecture is illustrated in Figure 10. Inside the while loop, an if-else
statement is required to check if u is greater than v or not, when they both
are not even. The decision of begin u or v is even only takes a clock cycle by
checking the least significant bits of these values. However, in a case where
they are both odd, the decision of whether u or v is bigger will require a
subtraction operation between u and v. In order to reduce the total clock
cycles, two subtracters are used for the case which u and v are both odd
numbers. In one of the subtracters, u is subtracted from v and in the other
one v is subtracted from u. The decision, to select the bigger one, is made
by checking the borrow bits from the results of the subtraction operations.
Further clock cycle reduction is done by using the division operation in
the same clock cycle with the subtraction operations. Since the division
operation is a division by 2, a simple one bit shifter is used to perform the
division. Since, the decisions of the if-else statements in the while loop
can be made after performing the subtraction operations, extra storage is
needed in order to store temporary results. Therefore, one extra RAM block
is implemented for each of the u and v values. The RAM blocks are named
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as RAM u, RAM v, RAM u temp and RAM v temp. The selection
process of the RAM blocks is decided with a control mechanism. There
are two signals, u change and v change, which are used as write enable
and output selection signals. In the beginning of the process, u change
and v change are set accordingly; to store u and v values into RAM u
and RAM v and use the RAMs to read real u and v values. Then, in the
while loop if any u or v value is changed, its change signal also changes
to store temporary calculations to other RAM. For instance, RAM u holds
the real value of the u and for few iterations of the while loop (i.e. u did
not change). Because u is store in RAM u, all the temporary calculated
u values are stored in RAM u temp. When, in an if-else statement the
u changes, then RAM u temp will be used as the real u source and the
temporary calculations will be stored in RAM u. Since this architecture is
used to make the decision of the if-else statement, the decisions are sent to
the r   s architecture for r and s calculation.
• R-S Architecture: As in the u   v architecture, the r   s architecture can
also be implemented with extra RAMs to hold temporary values. However,
this approach increase the slice usage of the FPGA. Therefore, we imple-
mented another method to decrease the usage of LUTs without an increase
in the total clock cycles for the operations, which is illustrated in Figure 11.
In this method, the r   s architecture waits for decisions from the u   v
architecture. Since this decisions are made after each iteration in the u  v
architecture, the r   s architecture receives the decisions by one iteration
behind. For instance, when the u  v architecture is in the third iteration of
the while loop, the r   s architecture performs the second iteration. since
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Figure 10: U-V Architecture
the decisions are known beforehand, r  s architecture needs one RAM per
r and s values.
The r   s architecture also holds the design to perform the second part
of the algorithm for Montgomery inversion. The algorithm 3 is simple to
implement by shift and subtraction operations, and to reduce area utilization
it was implemented within the r   s architecture. After the calculation of
the r and s values, the RAM r holds the r value and the RAM s is free
for further usage. The second part of the Montgomery inversion algorithm
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is realized as follows: At start RAM r is used as the source of r to perform
the calculations. In each iteration, r is stored with a shift operation in one
RAM and with a shift and a subtraction operation in the other. At the end
of each iteration, by looking at the borrow bits, one of the RAM blocks is
selected as the updated r for the next iteration.
r s
<<1
Mux Mux
<<1
RAM_r RAM_s
  temp
W_e W_ew_control_r
Mux Mux
real_r real_r
dec_signal dec_signal
phase_select
r s
w_control_s
Mux
<<1
r s
N
real_r
real_r_select
Phase I/II
Phase II
Figure 11: R-S Architecture
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5.2.2 Point Addition
The point addition implementation is performed on Huff Curves. Since the design
is complex, the point addition is performed by creating a processor that performs
modular arithmetic to reduce its complexity. A general overview of the architec-
ture is illustrated in Figure 12. The architecture is formed in three parts which
are control logic, ram block and arithmetic unit. The detail information on the
architectures is as follows:
Arithmetic Unit: The arithmetic unit consist of four sub-arithmetic operations.
The first sub-arithmetic operator is the Montgomery inversion, which was de-
scribed in detail in Section 5.2.1. The second sub-arithmetic operator is the mod-
ular addition/subtraction operation and the same architecture is used for both ad-
dition and subtraction with a selection input. Both addition and subtraction are
a simple operations and timing for the operations is as follows: W , which is the
total number of word blocks, clock cycle to enter the input, two clock cycles to
perform the calculation and W clock cycles to output the result. Hence, the to-
tal number of clock cycles will be 2  W + 2 for all the addition process. The
last sub-arithmetic unit is Montgomery multiplication. This arithmetic unit is not
implemented rather an efficient, existing design is used from [26].
The arithmetic unit is designed to handle the sub-arithmetic operations with
the given inputs. The arithmetic unit takes the operands along with the modulus
as inputs and these parameters are transferred in to the sub-arithmetic units. The
selection of the sub-arithmetic unit is realized by a opcode. Since there are four
arithmetic operations, the opcode takes 2 bit input for operation selection. The
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input responses of the arithmetic unit for the opcodes is as follows: 2’b00: The
arithmetic unit performs a modular addition. 2’b01: The arithmetic unit performs
a modular subtraction. 2’b10: The arithmetic unit performs a Montgomery in-
version. 2’b11: The arithmetic unit performs a Montgomery multiplication. Any
calculation performed in the sub-arithmetic units, will be given as output with a
finished signal. After the completion of the sub-arithmetic operations, the results
will takeW clock cycles to be outputted from the sub-arithmetic architectures and
the results are inserted into the RAM Block by the Control Logic.
RAM Block: The RAM Block holds eleven RAMs for storage. It takes three
address buses to select three RAMs that will be used in the calculation process.
Two buses are used to select two inputs to feed the Arithmetic Unit for calculations
and one bus is used to take the address of the RAM to store the results from
the Arithmetic Unit. The Control Logic gives a read signal to the RAM Block
so that two selected RAMs will output the values to the Arithmetic Unit to use
them in sub-arithmetic operations. After sub-arithmetic operations finish their
calculations, the results are written to the selected RAM by activating a write
signal by the Arithmetic Unit.
Control Logic: The Control Logic is used to control the arithmetic unit and
RAM Block to produce the desired output, which is point addition for the Huff
Curve. The calculation algorithm for the point addition of the Huff Curve was
given in Section 2.4.1. In our Control Logic, we implemented the point addition
operation in twenty steps of arithmetic logic operations. Every step has the fol-
lowing structure to perform the desired operation: Opcode, RAM Address of the
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operator 1, RAM Address of the operator 2, RAM address of the result. Con-
trol Logic manages the execution of the structures in each step by distributing the
elements of the structure and performing the steps one at a time.
In order to reduce the total timing in point addition, a trick is performed in
the arithmetic of point addition. The costliest operation among the sub-arithmetic
units is the Montgomery inversion. The point addition calculation needs to per-
form this costly operation twice, once to calculate the x coordinate of the point
addition and once to calculate the y coordinate of the point addition. In order
to reduce the cost, two inversion operations are converted into one inversion and
three multiplication operations. The reduction is performed as follows:
1. Lets, a and b are two numbers to be inverted.
2. In two inversion case:
(a) The a will be inversed by performing one inversion, a 1 mod N
(b) The b will be inversed by performing one inversion, b 1 mod N
3. In one inversion and three multiplication case:
(a) The a will be multiplied by b, which will result in ab mod N
(b) Then, one inversion operation will be performed on ab mod N !
(ab) 1 mod N
(c) Later, to find the inversion of a a multiplication operation will be per-
formed as: (ab) 1  b mod N ! a 1 mod N
(d) Lastly, to find the inverse of b another multiplication will be performed
as: (ab) 1  a mod N ! b 1 mod N
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In the below the twenty steps to calculate the point addition is given for P1 +
P2 = P3. The coordinates for the points Pi is shown with the same index i as xi
and yi. Also, among the eleven RAMs, six of them hold the necessary information
that will be used in the calculation process such as x1, y1, x2, y2, n as modulus
and 2n for Montgomery arithmetic. The other five RAMs are used for temporary
storage and their names are R0, R1, R2, R3, R4.
1. R0  x1  x2
2. R1  y1  y2
3. R2  R0 R1
4. R3  2n  R2
5. R4  R3 +R0
6. R4  R4  R1
7. R3  R3  R0
8. R3  R3 +R1
9. R2  R3 R4
10. R2  R2 1
11. R3  R2 R3
12. R4  R2 R4
13. R0  2n +R0
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14. R1  2n +R1
15. R0  R0 R3
16. R1  R1 R4
17. R2  x1 + x2
18. R3  y1 + y2
19. R0  R0 R2 (output 1 : x3)
20. R3  R1 R3 (output 2 : y3)
Control Logic
Modular 
Multiplication
Operand 1
Operand 2
ModulusRAM Block
Operand 1
Address
Operand 2
Address
Result
Address
Read
Enable
Opcode
Done
Result
Write
Enable
Arithmetic Unit
Modular 
Inversion
Modular 
Addition /
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Figure 12: Point Addition Architecture
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5.2.3 Pollard Rho
We have implemented the Pollard Rho attack algorithm for Huff curves in our
cluster. The computation part of the attack is performed by FPGAs and the data
management and FPGA controls are handled by the cluster-head. The attack can
be divided into two main parts, as the Server and Huff Curve Attack Architecture:
Server
The cluster-head is our server in the Pollard Rho attack algorithm. It is used
to handle the parts that is hard or impossible to handle with hardware, such as
data storage, management, control flow of the attack, etc. The server consists of
the following modules: Pollard Rho Point Generator: The module is used to
create a random P , Q and l to create a test attack. It is also used to create random
starting points for Huff Curve Attack Architecture. Database: The database is
used to store distinguished points along with their coefficients. Also it is used in
searching distinguished point collusions. Communication Interface: It is used
to handle the communication between the server and the FPGAs. The realization
of the communication is performed via the software library which was described
in section 5.1.2. Modular Arithmetic: This module is used in case of a collusion
to calculate the lcal from the collusion and compare the result with l to check its
correctness.
Huff Curve Attack (HCA) Architecture
We have implemented the computational part of the Pollard Rho Attack in
hardware to benefit from the parallelization. The HCA architecture consists of
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several inner architectures to perform the attack. These are configuration switch
controller, calculation modules and a control logic. Configuration Switch Ar-
chitecture: Since, the implementation is done by using the configuration switch
architecture, a controller is implemented to manage the configuration switch op-
eration when the hardware module completes its operation. HCA Control Logic:
The HCA Control Logic is used to control the flow of the attack. For instance,
it manages the calculation modules to read/write data from/to the flash memory
to prevent collusions, since there is only one flash bus. Also it manages order
of calculation steps for the calculation modules to operate them in synchronous.
Calculation Module: The calculation modules are used to calculate the point ad-
ditions for the attack. Any number of module can be implemented as long as there
is available not utilized area in the FPGA. For instance, only two modules can
fit into Spartan-3E 500 FPGAs and Spartan-3E 1600 can hold up to six modules.
The calculation module consist of the following architecture:
• Ram Tables: The ram tables contain the initial and updating values for the
calculation. These areQx,Qy, Px, Py,Rx,Ry,Rc,Rd and n as the modulus.
The points are stored into the RAMs before starting the attack and Rx, Ry,
Rc and Rd are the values that are updated in every point calculation.
• Point Addition Architecture: The point addition architecture, that is used,
was described in section 5.2.2. It takes the inputs from the Ram Tables
and calculates the next point and later outputs the results to the RAM Table
again.
• Modular Adder: The modular adder is used to update the Rc and Rd val-
ues. According to the random walk function, only Rc, only Rd or both Rc
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and Rd are updated.
• Flash Module: The Flash module is used to read/write data from/to the
flash memory.
• Distinguished Point Checker: The Distinguished Point Checker checks
distinguished point property of the calculated output. In our case it means
the 15 most significant bits of the point is zero. It is a simple comparator
logic and when a point is featured as a distinguished point, a signal is send
to the Calculation Module Controller Logic so the point can be written into
the flash memory.
• Calculation Module Controller Logic: The controller logic controls the
flow of the Calculation Module by communicating with the HCA Controller
Logic. It manages the flow of point calculations, as well as writing oper-
ations of the distinguished points to the flash memory. It waits for a write
signal from the HCA Controller Logic to prevent collusions while using
Flash Module, since there may exist multiple Calculation Modules in the
design.
The visual overview of the Calculation Module and the Pollard Rho Attack
Architecture are illustrated in Figures 13 and 14.
These two main parts, the Server and the HCA architecture, are used by cre-
ating a protocol between them to perform the Huff Curve Pollard Rho attack on
FPGAs. The details of the protocol and the realization of the attack is given as
follows:
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Figure 13: Calculation Module
1. The Server creates a random l for two random points P and Q such as
l  P = Q.
2. The Server creates random starting points according to the number of calcu-
lation module engines in the FPGA device. Two points per Spartan-3e500
and six points per Spartan-3e1600.
3. The Server converts the points to the Montgomery form. Later, it converts
the points into point packages, so that calculation module can use them.
4. The Server connects to all the FPGAs and sends the point data packages to
the FPGAs.
5. The Server sends configuration command to the FPGAs and waits for the
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Figure 14: Pollard Rho Attack Architecture
results.
6. The Huff Curve Attack Architecture, distributes the points to the calculation
engines and they start to calculate random points.
7. If any point has distinguished point feature, the point is stored with its co-
efficients in the flash memory.
8. All the calculation module engines need to calculate 25 distinguished points
per engine. In other words a total of 50 distinguished points in Spartan-
3e500 and 150 points in Spartan-3e1600.
9. When the points are calculated, a configuration switch occurs and the soft-
core sends the results to the Server.
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10. The Server takes the results and put into a distinguished point list.
11. The distinguished point list is searched for a collusion with the new added
points.
12. If a collusion is found, the points are converted back from Montgomery
form and the l is calculated. Then, the server waits for other FPGAs to
finish their jobs.
13. If there is not a collusion, the last distinguished points5 of every calculation
module engine is converted into point packages.
14. These point packages are send to the FPGA and configuration command is
sent so that more distinguished points will be calculated.
15. The Server continues this operation until it finds a collusion and stops the
process.
5.3 Experiments
In this section, we give detailed information on the experiments that we performed
in our FPGA cluster to measure its performance.
5The last distinguished points are chosen, so the calculation module engines can continue to
calculate points where they left
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5.3.1 First Experiment
The first experiment is intended to find out the efficiency of using the FPGA
boards mainly for cryptographic acceleration if the hardware unit and the soft-
core cannot co-exist in the FPGA board and therefore, configuration switch is
necessary. The experiment is performed as follows: the cluster head sends input
values (e.g. messages to be encrypted or signed) to the FPGA device which are
written in the parallel flash thereafter. To alleviate the timing overhead in commu-
nication and writing operations, the data are sent in relatively large chunks since
writing large arrays of data to a flash memory gives better timing results. After the
transmission is completed, a configuration switch command is sent to the FPGA.
Since we are interested only in the overhead the whole process creates, the
hardware unit reads the data from the parallel flash first and then writes it back
to it. Without doing anything else, it switches immediately back to the softcore
configuration. Following the startup of the softcore, a connection to the cluster
head is initiated and the same data in the parallel flash is sent back.
The data exchanged between the cluster head and the FPGA are sent in dif-
ferent packet sizes (i.e. sizes of send/receive buffers in both sides). The timing
values obtained through averaging for the first experiment are enumerated in rows
2-4 of Table 1. As can be observed, using large buffer sizes and larger arrays
of data helps reducing the overhead. To give an idea what these overhead val-
ues actually mean, we study the case where the FPGA board is used for RSA
acceleration. Timing overhead for handling 1 MB of data is about 27.31 s, on
average. 1 MB of data, for example, means 8192 RSA operation (e.g. signature),
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where the modulus is 1024 bit. This results in an overhead of 3.33 ms per 1024-
bit RSA operation. Considering that the state-of-the-art implementation of RSA
for Spartan-3E in [26] executes the same operation in about 8 ms, this roughly
increases the effective time per RSA operation by 37% percent, on average. Note
that this overhead would be about 0.87 s for 1 KB data size, which is definitely
not an acceptable performance for a cryptographic accelerator. In summary, our
FPGA cluster may be useful in case the configuration switch is necessary only
when we are able to group the input data in large chunks.
Packet Storage
Size (B) Device 1 KB 10 KB 100 KB 1 MB
256 Parallel Flash 15.74 17.38 32.70 216.81
512 Parallel Flash 14.40 15.50 21.11 102.90
1024(opt.3) Parallel Flash 6.96 7.44 8.79 27.31
1024(opt.3) SDRAM 0.27 0.35 1.06 7.81
Table 1: Timing overhead (in seconds) for different data and packet sizes
5.3.2 Second Experiment
In the second experiment, we measured the time to send and receive data of differ-
ent sizes when configuration switch is not needed for the scenario where the cryp-
tographic unit and the softcore fit in the FPGA device. The cryptographic hard-
ware unit can be directly connected to the softcore peripheral within the FPGA.
The SDRAM can be used to store the data since there is no configuration switch
that causes the SDRAM to miss refreshment cycles. The timing values for the
second experiment are enumerated in the last row of Table 1 only for buffer size
of 1024 B. As can be observed from the table, using the SDRAM rather than the
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parallel flash, decreases the total time by 19.50 s for 1 MB of data.
However, the timing values in the last row of Table 1 should not really be con-
sidered as actual overhead for two reasons. Firstly, operations for sending/receiving
data and writing/reading to/from the SDRAM can be overlapped with the actual
cryptographic computation. Secondly, since the softcore is a microprocessor that
can implement any server process reachable from the network, the time spent on
the communication and SDRAM access will be similar to the overhead that a PC
would incur for the same reason. Therefore, using FPGA without configuration
switch does not add significant overhead for many scenarios.
5.3.3 Third Experiment
In the third experiment, we tried to measure the total overhead time when the
data transfer is not intense and configuration switch can be used, which is typical
mostly for cryptanalytic purposes. The cluster head sends a message of 32 B to the
FPGA board, which contains the task description as well as the input parameters.
Assuming that hardware unit is a special-purpose design that implements a limited
number of interfaces, the task description occupies only a small fraction of the
message, leaving the rest for input parameters. Moreover, increasing the message
size to a certain extent (double or triple) does not lead to any significant increase
in timing spent on communication.
After the task description and input parameters are received, configuration
switch occurs and the hardware unit that will accomplish the task takes over the
FPGA. On job completion, it writes the results back to the parallel flash and hands
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over the FPGA back to the softcore via another configuration switch. The softcore
reads the results and sends them back to the cluster head. With this, the FPGA
becomes available for further tasks. In the experiment, we performed all these
steps except for the actual computation time of the task to determine the overhead
in time. The timing results for one, two, and three FPGA boards are measured as
7.06 s, 7.09 s, and 7.14 s, respectively.
The interpretation of these timing values can be as follows. When there is
one FPGA board available for tasks, 7.06 s after a task is sent to it (excluding
the duration of the task itself), the cluster head can send another job. In order to
compensate these overhead values, the cluster head should send jobs that will take
relatively higher execution times to an FPGA board6.
The timing values can also be seen as the throughput of the cluster. Assuming
one unit of task is sent to the FPGA boards every time, the throughput (number
of task units sent in a unit time) increases linearly by the number of FPGAs. For
instance, with three FPGA boards, we can initiate approximately three times more
task units compared to one FPGA board case.
5.3.4 Fourth Experiment
In the next experiment, we performed an exhaustive key search for PRESENT
algorithm [2], which is a lightweight block cipher intended for embedded appli-
6Another motivation of sending long lasting jobs to the FPGA boards every time is the fact that
there is a constraint on the number of writes that can be performed on the parallel flash memory.
Since each task assignment necessitates writings to the flash memory, tasks that will run longer
will significantly increase the lifetime of the board.
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Area Max/Usable no of keys
Conf. LUT + Slice Freq. (MHz) tried in  60s
Single
PRESENT 3% + 3% 187.37/NA NA
13 928,628,190
PRESENT 74% + 99% 65.23/50 in 61.76 s
7 PRESENT 510,656,511
+ Softcore 83% + 99% 53.709/50 in 60.10 s
Table 2: Experimental results for exhaustive key search
cations. The results for a single FPGA board are listed in Table 2.
The second row gives the implementation results for a single encryption en-
gine of the PRESENT algorithm. As can be seen in the third row, the maxi-
mum number of encryption engines that will fit in Spartan-3E is only 13 and
there is a significant decrease in the clock frequency. This is natural due to
two reasons: i) additional control circuit that enables the parallel execution of
13 encryption engines incurs some overhead, and ii) successful optimization for
placement-and-routing steps becomes harder for larger designs. With configu-
ration switch and communication costs included, we are able to test about 928
million keys in 61.76 s. Note that in this part of the experiment, the softcore
is able to run at a clock rate of 83 MHz since it executes alone in the entire
FPGA chip. This 60% increase in operation frequency allows us to accelerate
operations in the softcore mode. The last row enumerates the experimental re-
sults when there is no configuration switch and the softcore and seven encryption
engines run concurrently at the same frequency value of 50 MHz. This experi-
ment demonstrate the advantage of configuration switch for exhaustive key search
applications. Note that speed optimized C implementation of the PRESENT al-
83
gorithm (cf. http://www.lightweightcrypto.org/present/) on a single-threaded PC
implementation with an AMD 3.2 GHz quad-core processor and 4 GB RAM can
try roughly 106 million keys in 62 s, which also demonstrates that acceleration of
PRESENT algorithm is possible.
5.3.5 Fifth Experiment
Finally, we implemented Pollard’s Rho method [31, 28], whose experimental
setup can be observed in Figure 15, to compute discrete logarithms in elliptic
curves over prime fields of odd characteristics. For elliptic curve arithmetic we
used Huff model to take advantage of the fast explicit formulae for point addi-
tions on Huff curves [14]. Functional units for modular arithmetic operations (i.e.
addition, multiplication, and inversion) are designed and optimized for FPGA im-
plementation. The FPGA boards are used to find the distinguished points, which
constitutes the most time-consuming part of the computation in Pollard’s Rho
method. Since a similar approach to the one in [7] is adopted, we only need to
implement elliptic curve addition. The hardware implementation of the circuit
to find the distinguished points (i.e. distinguished points-generating engine) con-
sumes 50% of the total LUTs, 19% of slice flip-flops, and 5% of the block RAMs.
While the design can be synthesized at maximum clock frequency of 70:4 MHz,
we operate it at 50 MHz, which is one of the applicable clock frequency values
for the FPGA board. In the experiments, we used an elliptic curve defined over
a prime field where the prime is a 160-bit integer. The order of the base point
is chosen as a 25-bit integer to demonstrate that the discrete logarithm can be
computed within a reasonable amount of time using several FPGA boards. Using
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three boards, each with one instance of the distinguished point-generating engine,
our experiments demonstrate that we can compute one discrete logarithm over
the described elliptic curve in about 30 minutes, on average. A single-threaded
PC implementation on an AMD 3.2 GHz quad-core processor with 4 GB RAM
completes the same task in about 6 minutes, on average, using NTL package [34].
Therefore, in order to outperform the single-threaded PC implementation, at least
16 instances of the distinguished point-generating engine must be implemented in
the FPGA cluster.
Figure 15: Experimental Setup of FPGA cluster
In order to demonstrate that the time performance of the attack improves lin-
early with the number of FPGA boards (and the total number of distinguished
point-generating engines), we conducted several experiments. Firstly, we opti-
mized the distinguished point-generating engine to fit two instances of it in one
Spartan-3E500 and six instances of it in one Spartan-3E1600 devices. Secondly,
we employed different number of FPGA boards in our experiments. Using the
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same curve and the base point mentioned above, we solved different number of
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems and enumerated the timing statistics in
Figure 16. As can be observed from the table, we can solve one elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem in about 5.03 minutes using seven FPGA boards (i.e.
22 instances of distinguished point-generating engine), on average7.
Figure 16: Timing statistics (in seconds) for Pollard Rho’s alg. on different num-
ber of FPGA boards
In addition, newer versions of the Spartan devices can accommodate more
instances of the engine than the FPGA devices used in the experiments. Table 3
7We used Asus GIGAX1008B 8 Port 10/100 Layer2 Switch to connect seven FGPA boards.
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shows implementation results for the distinguished points-generating engine for
different target devices. The FPGA device used in the experiments is very modest
in available resources (cf. XC3S500E in the second column of Table 3) while
a slightly better and more recent Spartan-3E device (XC3S1600E) is capable of
implementing six instances of distinguished points-generating engine resulting
in a much higher throughput in a single FPGA device. A new technology in
Spartan family, Spartan 6, offers more resources and more than doubles the clock
frequency for the design. Much more advanced, yet relatively expensive FPGA
devices such as Virtex 6 in Table 3 can offer far more superior performance by
accommodating many more instances of distinguished points-generating engine.
Reconfigurable LUT Mult./DSP Max. Clock
device usage usage Frequency (MHz)
XC3S500E 4687/9317 4/20
(Spartan 3E) (50%) (20%) 70.4
XC3S1600E 4660/29504 4/36
(Spartan 3E) (15%) (11%) 70.4
XC6SLX45T 3313/27288 4/58
(Spartan 6) (12%) (6%) 179.5
XC6SL150T 3313/92152 4/180
(Spartan 6) (3%) (2%) 179.5
XC6VLX240T 3316/150720 4/768
(Virtex 6) (< 1%) (< 1%) 222.5
XC6VLX550T 3316/343680 4/864
(Virtex 6) (< 1%) (< 1%) 222.5
Table 3: Critical resource usage of the distinguished points-generating engine on
different FPGA devices
8In these experiments, we performed the attack using three and seven boards of Spartan-3E500,
which can fit two instances of Pollard Rho Attack.
9In this experiment, we performed the attack using two Spartan-3E1600, which can fit six
instances of Pollard Rho Attack, along with five boards of Spartan-3E500.
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6 Conclusion and Future Works
FPGAs are powerful candidates to parallelize the cryptographic operations that
will be used as to measure the security levels of the cryptographic algorithms
against cryptanalytic attacks. On top of it, a cluster formed by a number of FP-
GAs can increase the computational power linearly. However, there is a trade-
off between the utilization of the communication interfaces and the parallelized
hardware resources: the more the communication interfaces utilized, the less the
parallelized hardware resources. Therefore, it is important to minimize the cost
imposed by the communication interfaces.
The experiments demonstrate that the proposed FPGA cluster can be useful
for both cryptographic acceleration and implementing cryptanalytic attacks. Dy-
namic configuration switch between the softcore and the hardware unit, proposed
as among the foremost contributions of this work, proves to be useful especially
in exhaustive search applications in cryptanalysis, where the need for interprocess
communication is very limited (if not absent). Dynamic configuration switch can
be useful even for more powerful FPGA devices since FPGA resources salvaged
from the softcore can be put into effective use. Moreover, running the softcore
alone in the FPGA can be beneficial in increasing the operating frequency.
The proposed FPGA cluster offers advantages (by means of hardware par-
allelism) over PC-based implementations, when a single FPGA device can ac-
commodate as many instances of the main computation unit as possible. While
exhaustive search for simple algorithms, such as PRESENT, can be substantially
accelerated, relatively heavy-weight algorithms, such as RSA, does not benefit
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from the cluster if only one instance of RSA circuit is implemented in one FPGA
device. For the acceleration of heavy-weight algorithms, either more advanced
FPGA devices or a multitude of simple FPGA devices should be used. There
are also the moderate-weight algorithms that lie between the simple- and heavy-
weight algorithms, through which an improvement, compared to PCs, can be ob-
served by using sufficient number of FPGAs (i.e. Huff curve attack). Naturally,
price performance analysis of the FPGA cluster must be performed on the basis
of the specific operation we are trying to accelerate.
In addition to our contributions, the developed software library provides a
transparent interface to process data within the hardware modules, yielding even a
software programmer to utilize them easily. Besides, our FPGA cluster can benefit
from both hardware resources of FPGAs and software resources of the cluster
head. For instance, if there were no software resources, i.e. database and control
mechanism, in the Huff curve attack, described in Section 5.2.3, it would not be
possible to perform the Pollard Rho parallel attack. Nonetheless, the idea of using
software resources can be extended to multi-core parallelism of the cryptographic
computations in the cluster head, to further decrease the corresponding latency,
along with the use of the FPGA cluster.
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